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Background
Lower-riparian Bangladesh and upper-riparian India share more than 50 international 
rivers (Adel 2012: 528; Riaz 2011: 106; Islam 1992: 204; Ahmed 2012: 51; Afroz and Rah-
man 2013: 100).1 Needless to say, historically these rivers are very important, playing a 
vital part in many ways in people’s lives, such as, in agriculture and fisheries, vegetation 
and greenery, urban and rural water supplies, and navigation and communication. How-
ever, India has set up constructions for water diversion in more than 50 percent of these 
rivers. The largest one is upon the Ganges River commonly known as the Farakka Bar-
rage, which puts Bangladesh’s ecosystem at stake. In some border rivers, India has set up 
1 Experts have tended to show varied number of international rivers shared by Bangladesh and India: Islam (1992) says 
fifty-seven rivers are common to India and Bangladesh, while Riaz (2011), Ahmed (2012), and Afroz and Rahman (2013) 
write the number is fifty-four, and Adel (2012) says it is more than 50. Thus, we prefer to take the phrase ‘more than 50.’
Abstract 
The Indian government recently resumed the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam on 
the Barak River just 1 km north of Bangladesh’s north-eastern border. The construc-
tion work was stalled in March 2007 in the wake of massive protests from within and 
outside India. Experts have argued that the Dam, when completed, would cause colos-
sal disasters to Bangladesh and India, with the former being vastly affected: the Dam 
would virtually dry up the Surma and Kushiara, two important rivers for Bangladesh. 
Therefore, this controversial Dam project has generated immense public discontents 
leading to wider mass-movements in Bangladesh, India, and around the world. The 
movement has taken various forms, ranging from simple protests to a submission of 
a petition to the United Nations. Drawing on the “environmentalism of the poor” as a 
conceptual metaphor, the article examines this global movement to show how envi-
ronmental resistance against the Tipaimukh Dam has transcended national borders 
and taken on a transnational form by examining such questions as: who is protesting, 
why, in what ways, and with what effects. In order to elucidate the impending social 
and ecological impacts, which would potentially disrupt communities in South Asia, 
the paper offers some pragmatic policy recommendations that also seek to augment 
social mobility in the region.
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groins on her side of the river banks. Furthermore, Bangladesh River water is pumped 
stealthily from border-rivers by entities on the Indian side (Adel 2012). India’s decisions 
to build diversion constructions in international rivers and the arbitrary control of trans-
national rivers’ waters leading Bangladesh to suffer economically, socially and ecologi-
cally have triggered unending debates and resistances over the years.2 Nevertheless, the 
debate with Farakka Barrage and the Gajoldoba Barrage3 on the Teesta River is con-
ceived to be overshadowed by India’s recent decision to build another Dam, now at the 
Tipaimukh on the river Barak. India’s unilateral plan has prompted a wide range of 
debate and discussion on its merit in both India and Bangladesh (Mirza 2009). The 
debates have gradually transcended the realm of government officials and academics, 
and transformed into various modes of protests and resistance in India, Bangladesh, and 
beyond.
Officially called the Tipaimukh Multipurpose Hydroelectric Dam Project (henceforth 
the Tipaimukh Dam) on the Barak River4 is just 1 km north of Zakiganj in Sylhet, Bang-
ladesh. Theis Dam is spotted 500 meters downstream from the flowing rivers of Barak 
and Tuivai and sited in the south-western corner of Manipur state of India. Its reservoir 
will have a water storage capacity of 15,900 million cubic meters with a maximum depth 
of 1725.5 meters (Islam 2013: 156). Commissioned by India in mid 2000s, the Dam site 
lies in contiguity with two other states—Assam and Mizoram, that implies the involve-
ment of three states of Northeast India in the project. The Barak River which flows 
downstream to join the Surma and Kushiara river systems in Bangladesh is considered 
to be the lifeline of the Sylhet region in Bangladesh. The Dam is estimated to generate 
1500  MW of hydroelectric power, though the original consideration was to contain 
flood-water in the Cachar plains of the Indian state of Assam (D’Costa 2012: 153; Ahmed 
2012: 52). However, experts are concerned and have voiced apprehensions that the pro-
posed Dam would cause colossal damage to Bangladesh’s economy, society and environ-
ment, practically contributing to drying up two important rivers—the Surma (length: 
350 km) and the Kushiara (length: 110 km)—which provide water for most of the north-
eastern region of Bangladesh (Rahman 2009; Mirza 2009; Khan 2009; Mastoor 2011; 
Islam 2013). It will also affect the virgin haor ecosystem of Bangladesh (Adel 2012).
Over the last few decades, Indo-Bangladesh relations have not been strained more 
by any issue other than that of water. India continues to unilaterally control and man-
age most of the international rivers that Bangladesh shares with her. Impacted by cli-
mate change, India has planned to divert waters, from the northeast of the country to its 
drought-prone west and south, notably some fifty-four common rivers which flow from 
2 India’s withdrawals of Ganges waters at Farakka point and 90 other points within its territory alone has pushed Bang-
ladesh into a state of extreme vulnerability. Experts have said that the reduced flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh has 
caused scarcity of fresh water, species endangerment and extinction, obstruction to livestock raising, loss of livelihoods, 
people’s displacement, changes in crop production, reduction in navigable routes, extreme weather, increased flood 
occurrences, scarcity of potable water, groundwater contamination, reduction in costal sediment deposition, deteriora-
tion of the Ganges water quality and inland intrusion of saline water front (see Adel 2012).
3 As a part of irrigation project, India, in 1985, built Gajoldoba Barrage on Teesta River (at Gajoldoba, Jalpaiguri, West 
Bengal) that is commonly shared by both India and Bangladesh that seriously and adversely affects the latter particularly 
in agriculture and livelihoods. In response, Bangladesh, in late 1990s, built Teesta Barrage on Teesta River at Duani, 
Hatibandha of Lalmonirhat district. Due to upstream India’s arbitrary roles in water sharing, Bangladesh still suffers 
from withdrawal of waters by India through Gajoldoba Barrage.
4 Barak River has originated from the southern hills of Nagaland and passed through Manipur and Cachar in Assam, 
and entered Bangladesh joining the basin of Surma and Kushiara flown all the way to Meghna and Padma (Sinha 1995).
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upstream India to downstream Bangladesh (Kazmi 2009). Over the last several years, 
there have been intense debates between the academic circles, civil society, environmen-
tal groups, human rights organizations and the media in Bangladesh over the implica-
tions of the Tipaimukh Dam upon the dividend of water coming from upper-riparian 
India. This debate continued to get new impetus since the protest movement expanded 
to the transnational space (Rahman 2009; Islam 2013).
This study was conducted employing a triangulation of methods: a global ethnography 
based on a robust Internet search focusing on social media; correspondence with two 
dozen protesters in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Bangladesh; 
and qualitative interviews with ten policy analysts comprising UN officials, academics, 
and government officers from India and Bangladesh. We also use “intellectual activism”5 
as a novel methodological tool for our analysis. Using “environmentalism of the poor” as 
a conceptual metaphor, we examine: (a) how environmental resistance against the 
Tipaimukh Dam has transcended national borders and taken on a global and transna-
tional form; (b) who is protesting, why, in what ways, and with what effects. The paper 
provides an important insight of an Asian environmentalism which has originated in 
Asia but formed a global alliance, and offers pragmatic policy recommendations aiming 
to spur social change and development.
Following this brief introduction, the paper in the second section delineates “environ-
mentalism of the poor” as a conceptual metaphor. Drawing on this conceptual frame-
work, the paper in the third section examines the potential environmental and social 
impacts of the Tipaimukh Dam that have largely generated this movement. The fourth 
section sketches out the diverse methods of environmental protests and alliances sur-
rounding the Tipaimukh Dam. The paper concludes in the last section by raising some 
crucial issues which have broader policy implications seeking to encourage social change 
not only for the South Asian region but also for other parts of the world.
Environmentalism of the poor
Social or environmental movements consist of a large number of people who organize 
themselves to promote or resist social change. Social movements can be either proac-
tive- to promote social change- or reactive- to resist any social change. Sidney Tarrow 
(1994: 3–4) defines social movements as “collective challenges by people with common 
purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities.” 
His definition outlines four basic properties of social movements: collective challenge, 
common purpose, solidarity, and sustaining collective action. Social or environmental 
movements arise from widespread, deeply felt discontent, from the conviction that some 
condition of society is no longer tolerable (Henslin 2011). Under these conditions, “envi-
ronmentalism of the poor” proliferates.
Combining both environmental philosophy and activism, much has been written on 
various contours of environmentalism in the Global North ranging from the nature con-
servation movement to deep ecology to the new environmental paradigm (Islam 2013). 
While the previous trends continue to dominate the whole corpus of environmentalism 
5 “Intellectual activism” is mainly a concept developed by sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (2013); see her book On Intel-
lectual Activism (Temple University Press, Philadelphia). Intellectual activism requires sharp thinking and research, 
honest and dispassionate analysis, and common sense grounded in experience and observation on a subject.
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literature, the new trend seeks to delve into the environmentalism of the Global South. 
This new trend, still in the making, has been drafted with various titles. It has also been 
appropriately called livelihood ecology (Gari 2000), or liberation ecology (Peet and 
Watts 1996). While other scholars of global environmentalism such as Martinez-Alier 
(2002, 2014), Nixon (2011), Guha and Martinez-Alier (1997), Iain Davey (2009), and 
Anguelovski and Martinez-Alier (2014) have indiscriminately used the term “environ-
mentalism of the poor” to refer to as the environmentalism of the Global South.
Environmental justice as an organized movement has been almost confined to its 
“country of origin”—the United States, while popular environmentalism or livelihood 
ecology or the “environmentalism of the poor” are names given to the myriad of move-
ments in the Global South that struggle against environmental impacts that threaten 
poor people who are, in many countries, a majority of the population (Martinez-Alier 
2002). Environmentalism of the South is thus appropriately given the title of the “envi-
ronmentalism of the poor” since the poor people of the Global South have, by and 
large, been victims of the growth-centric development approach and the environmental 
footprints, and it is these poor people who have initiated and organized environmen-
tal movements in the South (Guha and Martinez-Alier 1997). This movement, to quote 
McMichael (2008: 245), “takes two forms: active resistance, which seeks to curb inva-
sion of habitats by states and markets; and adaptation, which exemplifies the centuries-
old practice of renewing habitats in the face of environmental deterioration. In the alter 
practice lie some answers to current problems.”
While social construction of a boundary between Northern and Southern environ-
mentalism often seems arbitrary, this distinction is periodically significant as the vibrant 
environmental movements in the Global South have been strikingly less represented in 
the discourse of environmentalism Islam ( 2012, 2013). In this paper, we will elucidate 
the environmental resistance against the Tipaimukh Dam in India as an example of the 
“environmentalism of the poor” focusing on the potential social and ecological costs of 
the Dam, dynamic and transnational nature of the resistance movement, and practical 
policy implications of this social and environmental activism for the geo-politics and 
social change of the region.
Social and environmental impacts of the Tipaimukh Dam
The environmentalists have posited that the Tipaimukh Dam would cause severe envi-
ronmental and social disasters to both Bangladesh and India. Once completed, their pri-
mary concern centres around Bangladesh being deprived of its share of the international 
river that supplies waters to hundreds of water bodies in the region. They fear that the 
Dam would ultimately dry up the Meghna River in the greater Sylhet region and nearby 
districts, and the Surma and the Kushiara rivers in winter season which provide water 
for most of the north-eastern regions of the country. The Dam would severely affect 
agriculture and fisheries, vegetation and greenery including local flora and fauna, and 
generate a massive displacement of people and livestock in Bangladesh. The effects of 
the Dam are not only confined to Bangladesh as it also of serious consequences to the 
people of the Indian states of Manipur and Nagaland as the Barak-Surma-Kushiara is 
an international river (Islam 2013; Arora and Kipgen 2012; Somokanta 2014). Figure 1 
shows the nexus of rivers in north-east Bangladesh and India.
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A number of studies on the Tipaimukh Dam have revealed that the successful imple-
mentation of the project would impact perilously on Bangladesh. In 2005, a research 
team comprising three members—Abu Saleh Khan, Md. Sohel Masud and Wahid 
Palash—pursued a study titled “Hydrological Impact Study of Tipaimukh Dam of India 
on Bangladesh”, and their findings describe the terrible potential outcomes to be faced 
by Bangladesh from the construction of the Dam which they have summarized in six 
broad categories: hydrology, flooding pattern and river-floodplain-wetland ecosystem, 
morphology, water quality, Dam collapse, and other general impacts (Khan et al. 2005). 
Arora and Kipgen (2012) have pointed out the main objections of the people from both 
Bangladesh and India to the Dam project which they have also grouped under six cat-
egories, albeit differently: location in a geologically unstable region; loss of biodiversity 
with submergence of land; economic feasibility studies and cost-benefit analysis; admin-
istrative lapses, procedural and human rights violations; social and cultural objections; 
and objections by Bangladesh. They argue that the proposed Dam site is located in Zone 
V of Seismic Zoning Map of India, and that during 1953–92, this region had experienced 
twenty-one earthquakes of more than 6.5° on the Richter scale (see also, Abbasi 2009). 
The resourceful forested hills, mostly in Tamenglong and Churachandpur districts along 
with the richest areas in terms of flora, fauna, and aquatic systems will be submerged. 
Hydrology of the region will be affected. The local indigenous people will have to bear 
the brunt of the project’s devastating impact, but they will not share the estimated 
revenue to be obtained from the project. Even people will not be able to afford buying 
electricity at a premium. There will be catastrophic effects on infrastructures including 
roads and highways. The indigenous Hmar and Zelinangrong Naga people’s jhum (shift-
ing cultivation) lands, wet rice fields, and forest and riverine habitat will be submerged 
and destroy their way of life. Official statistics shows, 1461 families will be directly dis-
placed, while other estimate shows, the Dam will submerge areas of about 311 sq. km 
covering 90 villages with 1310 families, including 27,242 hectares of forest and cultiva-
ble land and posing grave threat to biodiversity, flora and fauna of the region (Pamei 
2009; Yumnam 2008; cited in Arora and Kipgen 2012: 121). Apart from northeast India, 
the Dam will be a death-trap for Bangladesh, as about one-third of its population will 
be seriously affected. Sixteen districts of the Sylhet region will be directly and adversely 
affected (Arora and Kipgen 2012: 118–122).
Muzaffer Ahmad, an noted environmentalist and the president of Bangladesh Poribesh 
Andolon (Bangladesh Environmental Movement)—a leading environmentalist organiza-
tion in Bangladesh—in a press conference remarked that the Tipaimukh Dam would be 
“a disaster for Bangladesh’s river system, livelihood and environment”. “We have done 
rigorous study on the Tipaimukh Dam”, he continues, “and found that it is going to be 
more disastrous than the Farakka Barrage that has already destroyed the Padma river 
and ecology in the country’s south-western region.” He added, what is “power-luxury” 
for India is a “life-and-death question” for Bangladesh. Energy cannot be more impor-
tant than human disaster, continued Muzaffer.6 Similarly, M. R. Tarafdar (2009), a water-
resources expert, in an article “Tipaimukh Dam: an alarming venture” apprehended 
some adverse effects of the Dam. The construction of the proposed Dam would incur 
6 The Daily Star, 28 May 2009, Dhaka. Available at: http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.
php?nid=90183 (Accessed 16 Mar 2015).
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endless sufferings to Bangladesh which include hydrological drought and environmental 
degradation, among others. The Dam would cause the Surma and Kushiara to run dry 
periodically that would eventually result in agricultural, irrigational, navigational, and 
potable water crises. During this time, the ground water level would markedly fall which, 
in turn, would affect all dugouts and shallow tube-wells. Agriculture, which is dependent 
on both surface as well as groundwater, would embrace catastrophic effects: rice produc-
tion, the main component of Bangladesh agriculture, would drastically fall, leading to an 
increase in poverty (see also, Islam 2013).
According to an estimate, the Barak provides Bangladesh with 7–8 percent of its water, 
feeding hundreds of water bodies in the north-eastern region upon which millions of 
agricultural and fishing people are directly dependent. The collapse of the Dam would 
impound billions of cubic meters of water and cause devastating floods because of its 
gargantuan structure.7 The Dam site is a hazardous zone that entails the highest risk 
seismically. Inhabitants of Manipur too have felt that this Dam could turn out to be a 
source of sustained-dangers such as the potential loss of local biodiversity including 
flora and fauna, endangered species including pythons, gibbons, and herbal and medici-
nal plants, and the threatening of tribal land ownership. It would cause inundation of as 
many as ninety villages within a 311-square-kilometre radius (Jahangir 2009; Islam 2013: 
Arora and Kipgen 2012). For Bangladesh, the potential impacts are even more severe. 
According to a group of water experts in Bangladesh:
If the Dam is constructed, 16 districts of greater Sylhet will be affected. The immense 
natural disaster that will take place would be irreversible. Even though the Indian 
government is saying once the Dam is constructed, electricity will be generated and 
Bangladesh will benefit by importing the electricity. It does not make sense to make 
a certain part of Bangladesh a desert area, solely for the purpose of importing elec-
tricity (Dainik Destiny, 31 May 2009; also cited in Islam 2013).
The livelihoods of millions of people who are largely dependent on the fresh water of 
the Meghna for their subsistence and for broader food security of the region are at stake. 
Bangladesh is already battling water shortages due to climate change. The Tipaimukh 
Dam would add to the environmental cataclysm already predicted by environmentalists. 
According to Ainun Nishat, the country director of the International Union for Con-
servation of Nature (IUCN), the Dam would increase the risk of floods, and the water 
bodies in Sylhet would be overflowing even during the winter season. More importantly, 
the average sea-water level would rise. Surface irrigation would be in danger and cultiva-
tion and livelihoods in the area would be adversely affected. If India made a barrage at 
7 Dam failure is not an atypical event. Although the respective authority of the states concealed the news of the Dam 
catastrophic events, numbers of cases even have been found that report that the Dam collapse in different parts of the 
world for the last century has killed thousands of people, and understandably these people are essentially the inhabit-
ants of the downstream region (Khan et al. 2005). The country specific information on Dam collapse, as much as avail-
able, is given in Patrick McCully’s book Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams. See McCully (2001). 
For the Tipaimukh Dam, the possibility of earthquake cannot be dismissed. According to experts, the construction 
of the Dam (Tipaimukh) in a geologically sensitive zone, adjacent to the Taithu Faultline, gives rise to grave concerns 
about earthquake (see M. S. Siddiqui, “Non-navigational use of international water courses: Why delay ratification of 
the UN Convention?”, The Financial Express, 19 June 2014, Dhaka). Available at: http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.
com/2014/06/19/40204 (Accessed 17 Mar 2015).Dr Soibam Ibotombi of the Department of Earth Sciences, Manipur 
University warns the reservoir (of the Dam) may cause seismic disturbance in quake-prone Manipur. “The likelihood 
that during 1991–2020 the (Tipaimukh) region would experience an earthquake of magnitude 7.6 is between 40 and 60 
percent” (see Syed Zain Al-Mahmood’s article titled “The Dam Debate”, Dhaka Courier, 12 January 2012, Dhaka). Avail-
able at:http://www.dhakacourier.com.bd/the-dam-debate/(Accessed 17 Mar 2015).
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Fulertal (through which it would be able to manage water according to its needs), and 
procure water from the Barak River, the Surma and the Kushiara would become virtually 
dry (Al-Mahmood 2009; Jahangir 2009). Anticipating other long-term impacts of the 
Dam on Bangladesh, Tarafdar (2009) predicts:
The rosy, prosperous and healthy scenario may soon turn into history causing 
despondency desperation and misery to the people inhabiting the zone which is 
known for abundance of water, lush green field of crops and fish sanctuary. Massive 
environmental degradation will occur, drastically affecting weather and climate, 
turning a wet cooler habitat into a hot uncomfortable cauldron. The severity of 
micro-climate causing heat and dry conditions will gradually increase in intensity 
spreading over a large area over the years. It may be mentioned that rainfall that 
the area gets for 4–5 months and flood water that will be released from the Dam 
for a short period will not be enough to replenish the ground water. Climate and 
environmental change will force the farmers to reluctantly resort to planting low-
yielding drought-resistant crops (unknown to them).
Indian academics and environmentalists have also contested the controversial 
Tipaimukh Dam project. In an international conference titled “International Tipaimukh 
Dam Conference (ITDC-2005)” held at Dhaka in December 2005, Rabindranath, a 
prominent Indian water-rights activist and the coordinator of the River Basin Friends of 
Assam, expressed his sharp reaction to the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam, and 
argues that the “projected power requirement of ‘seven sisters’8 is 1900  MW in 2020 
while Delhi is up to generating 60,000 MW by building dams on rivers and tributaries, 
many of which are main sources of water for major Bangladeshi rivers. The 22-km 
chicken-neck dividing the seven sisters and the rest of India would not permit the trans-
fer of such high-velocity additional power that India has decided to sell to Laos, Viet-
nam, Cambodia and Thailand.”9 He further noted that “this power will not light our 
homes. If Tipaimukh (Dam) is built, the Surma and Kushiara (in Bangladesh) will be 
choked in a year. The Indian government is not considering preserving human liveli-
hoods and ecology, it is instead considering the dam issue in light of cement-mafia, iron-
mafia and turbine manufacturers.”10 Namdingpou Kamei (2006) lists the potential 
far-reaching environmental and social effects of the Dam on the local people:
  • A land area totaling 286.20 sq. km would be submerged forever.
  • The Barak waterfalls and Zeilad Lake, which are connected with the history of the 
Zeliangrong people, would forever be underwater; all folklore and legends would 
have no verifying monuments and would become made-up stories for the next gen-
eration.
  • More than 40,000 people would be rendered landless.
  • Eight villages situated at the Barak Valley would be completely underwater.
8 Seven north-east Indian states, such as Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura are 
popularly called ‘seven sisters.’
9 The Daily Star, 01 January 2006, Dhaka. Available at: http://archive.thedailystar.net/2006/01/01/d6010101075.htm 
(Accessed 16 Mar 2015).
10 Ibid.
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  • More than 90 villages, mostly in the Tamenglong district, would be adversely 
affected.
  • About 27,242 hectares of cultivable land would be lost.
  • The township of Nungba, subdivision headquarters, and the village along the NH-53 
would be severely affected.
  • The Dam would pose health hazards, including water borne diseases, industrial pol-
lution, and other environmental and ecological problems due to the increased water 
surface.
  • Increased salinity of ground water would make it unsafe for drinking and increase 
inconvenience to the people.
  • Frequent occurrences of destructive earthquakes in the area would be possible.
  • The decision was made without information from proper ecological studies, which 
thus overlooks the future challenges and problems that people will have to deal with.
  • The construction would directly affect people’s livelihoods. This natural product 
(water, plus its agriculture-related products), which the people rely upon for every 
aspect of their economy, would be totally cut off, which could result in economic and 
financial crises.
  • Consequent displacement and destruction of the people by implementing the project 
would pose a grave threat to people’s right to live in a vibrant democratic system.
  • The project, once completed, would submerge the exotic flora and fauna and rich 
gene pools, as Manipur is located in one of the genetic hot spots of the world where 
rare biodiversity resources exist.
  • There would be problems of displacement, resettlement, rehabilitation, repatriation 
and development.
  • The construction of the Dam would be a violation of democratic principles of gov-
ernance, such as inclusiveness, which acknowledges and considers indigenous voices.
  • The construction would show total disregard for the Zeliangrong ancient indigenous 
heritage, reflecting negatively on the partiality of the government.
  • Not only would the Barak basin be affected, but the Dam’s construction would also 
affect its tributaries (cited in Islam 2013:159–160).
While these figures are largely estimated, one cannot rule out the potential colossal 
environmental and social disasters. The Indian government has yet to reveal the full 
environmental-assessment report to the public. Nonetheless, independent specialists’ 
views on the project have engendered huge reservations over the Dam’s feasibility. A 
sense of injustice continues to grow among the people of India and Bangladesh over the 
Indian government’s unilateral decision. The government of India instead employed var-
ious public relations strategies, apparatuses and resources to convince the local people 
and the government of Bangladesh of the benefits and feasibility of the project. The cur-
rent ruling party of Bangladesh, Awami League (AL), has maintained warm relations 
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with India historically, and remains supportive to the Indian government’s decision.11 
However, people from all strata of society in Bangladesh have embarked on a massive 
social movement and have criticized their government’s role and implicit support for the 
Tipaimukh Dam project (Islam 2013).
Environmental resistance against the Tipaimukh Dam
The Tipaimukh has been a life-and-death question for Bangladesh, and thus people 
regardless of political affiliation, intellectual and ideological background, ethnic and cul-
tural variation, and religious affiliation have come onto a common platform to render 
massive protests against the construction of the Dam. With a unilateral demand for an 
abrogation of India’s decision, protests in different forms—rallies, human chains, protest 
meetings, seminars and symposia, strikes, and so forth—continue to carry on across the 
country. Protests and demonstrations have, indeed, transcended the national boundary 
and taken on a transnational from. The movement thus turned to a global social and 
environmental movement embodying the “environmentalism of the poor.”
The environmental movement in Bangladesh over the construction of the Tipaimukh 
Dam cannot be disconnected from the turbulent past and other bilateral tensions 
between Bangladesh and India, such as the disputes over the water sharing of the trans-
boundary rivers including the Ganges and Teesta as well as unabated tensions in borders 
between these two nations. The trajectory of the Indo-Bangladesh relations—mostly 
marked by bilateral tensions—has always been a key catalyst in the domestic politics of 
Bangladesh, and has drawn the political lines between the ruling AL and the main oppo-
sition—Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Begum Khaleda Zia, which has been 
actively supporting the anti-Tipaimukh Dam movement. Sheikh Hasina’s government 
which came to power in late 2008 through a participatory election, and for the second 
consecutive term in early 2014 through a non-participatory election12 has always been 
accused by the critics and the opposition parties of being pro-Indian and thus adopting a 
“subservient” foreign policy towards India. A number of cabinet ministers constantly 
remark that the Dam would not harm Bangladesh and this is reflected in the govern-
ment’s lukewarm response to India’s decision. The four-party alliance (now extended to 
twenty-party alliance) led by BNP expressed its sharp reaction to the government’s 
11 There is a general perception in Bangladesh that Sheikh Hasina’s government has virtually no concern about the dis-
astrous impacts of the Tipaimukh Dam on Bangladesh. This perception, in fact, originates from the speeches and com-
ments of different ministers of the government, and advisors to the prime minister at different points of time on the 
high-profile issue of Tipaimukh. After the agreement was signed between the Government of Manipur, NHPC Ltd. and 
Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd (SJVN) in October 2011on the construction of the Dam, Dr. Mashiur Rahman and Dr. Gow-
her Rizvi, advisors to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina paid a visit to New Delhi in early December 2011 to discuss their 
concerns. Back home, Dr. Gowher Rizvi wrote an article in the Daily Star (13 December 2011), in which he did not 
express concerns on the impact of the Dam on Bangladesh which drew critical comments from members of civil society 
as being misconceived (see Barrister Harun ur Rashid’s article titled “Tipaimukh Dam: What is the current position?”, 
Dhaka Courier, 14 March 2013, Dhaka). Available at: http://www.dhakacourier.com.bd/tipaimukh-dam-what-is-the-
current-position/. (Accessed 17 Mar 2015). Many times, the ministers and advisors of the AL government have asserted 
that the Dam would not harm Bangladesh, which has prompted people to become convinced that the government has 
no concern about the potential disastrous effects the Dam would cause to Bangladesh; it is rather, by speaking in this 
manner, endorsing the Indian government’s design. (see Syed Zain Al-Mahmood’s article titled “The Dam Debate”, 
Dhaka Courier, 12 January 2012, Dhaka). Available at: http://www.dhakacourier.com.bd/the-dam-debate/(Accessed 17 
Mar 2015).
12 10th parliamentary elections held on 5 January 2014 were boycotted by the major opposition alliance called 20-party 
combine led by BNP. The election was not only one-sided; with a majority of seats elected without any contest whatso-
ever, more than half the country’s electorate was directly denied their right to franchise (Dhaka Courier, 20 February 
2014, Dhaka). Available at: http://www.dhakacourier.com.bd/settling-for-second-best/ (Accessed 18 Mar 2015). Experts’ 
opinion suggests that out of 300 parliamentary seats 154 elected unopposed has placed the 10th parliament to suffer 
serious legitimacy crisis (see Shayan S. Khan’s article “The 7-year itch”, Dhaka Courier, 13 March 2014, Dhaka). Available 
at: http://www.dhakacourier.com.bd/the-7-year-itch/ (Accessed 18 Mar 2015).
Page 10 of 16Islam and Islam  Bandung J of Global South  (2016) 3:27 
stance on the Tipaimukh issue, and vowed to take the issue to international forums if the 
government fails to stop it. The civil society groups had also been critical of the govern-
ment’s role on the Tipaimukh Dam in question (Rahman 2009; Islam 2013).
Under growing pressure from the opposition parties, civil society, intelligentsia, and 
the media, the government proceeded to send a parliamentary delegation to India to 
survey the proposed Dam site. The delegation comprising ten members, all of whom 
were also the members of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Water Resources 
led by Abdur Razzak, the then Water Resources Minister of Bangladesh, visited New 
Delhi en route to the Tipaimukh Dam site in Manipur in early August 2009. They how-
ever failed to survey the Dam because of weather condition (Rashid 2013; Islam 2013). 
The delegation members were reported to have had stressed to their Indian counterparts 
the need for negotiations regarding the concerns and issues raised between both coun-
tries. Concurrently, Bangladesh offered to conduct a joint study with India to examine 
the implications of the Dam project on the region and the future flow of water in the 
concerned river system, which directly affects Bangladesh due to its position as a lower-
riparian country.
The civil society groups including the environmentalists in Bangladesh had formed the 
National Tipaimukh Dam Resistance Committee (NTDRC). A long March organized by 
different civil society organizations which included NTDRC and Sylhet Division 
Unnayan Sangram Samiti (a committee that fights for development in Sylhet Division), 
supported by BNP and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI)—the major Islamist party in 
Bangladesh and often branded as a “politically hardliner”, marched towards the 
Tipaimukh Dam site on 10 August 2009, but was stopped at the international border by 
the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), currently Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB).13 BJI’s active 
role and support for this cause could become a genuine source of concern for India 
(Rahman 2009). Prior to the long March, BJI attempted to organize massive protests to 
mobilize people’s support against the Dam, but the government managed to thwart 
these protest movements. All the frontline leaders of the party were arrested by the gov-
ernment in 2010. Although the government was showing its zero-tolerance against any 
popular political-resistance movement surrounding the Tipaimukh Dam in Bangladesh, 
massive environmental resistance overseas and online continued (Islam 2013).
In August 2009, the leaders of NTDRC at a discussion held at Dhaka Reporters Unity 
(DRU) in the capital warned the people about the potential danger of the Tipaimukh 
Dam, and asked for their spontaneous and broader participation in the anti-Dam 
movement. They stressed that the construction of the Dam on the Barak River would 
desert the northeastern region of the country, and thus they called upon the people to 
remain alert on the issue so that the Indian government would not be able to go ahead 
unhindered in its construction. The meeting was held as part of an observance with the 
“Global Solidarity Sit-in the Tipaimukh Dam Programme”, which was observed simul-
taneously in different district headquarters around the country and cities around the 
world, including Shilchar, Calcutta and Patna, India; Canberra, Australia; Tokyo, Japan; 
and New York, U.S. Referring to fifty large dams in the world, an engineer named Hilal, a 
13 The Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) have been renamed the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) after the February 2009 mutiny 
by the BDR regular sepoys against their senior officials who were on deputation from the army officers. For more infor-
mation, see http://bgb.gov.bd/index.php/bgb/history_en.
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discussant, said that a “water syndicate” is now actively constructing more Dams on big 
rivers to realize their selfish interests. “Such immoral activities of the syndicate have also 
contributed to global climate change,” he continued. Shankar Roy, a renowned Indian 
journalist and Dinesh Mitra, an Indian engineer who also happens to be a prominent 
leader of the anti-Tipaimukh Dam movement, both expressed solidarity with the partici-
pants of the program (The New Nation 2009).
George Galloway, a visiting British parliamentarian, who is internationally known 
for his role as a human rights defender and social activist, showed his solidarity with 
this movement and called for an international enquiry into the potential environmen-
tal impact of India’s proposed Tipaimukh Dam. The inquiry would need to examine 
the impact on the population of both Bangladesh and India, he added. He opined that 
the project is an international issue due to its implications for the climate and the envi-
ronment, and thus India’s decision to build the Dam unilaterally would be “a criminal 
offence.” He reaffirmed his benevolent support by saying “I will fight to prevent the mak-
ing of this Dam. Not only the Bangladeshi people, but a section of the Indian people will 
also be affected. Even the Indian expatriates in London protested… against the proposed 
Dam” (Islam 2013: 162). Galloway led a UK delegation and a huge Bangladeshi crowd on 
a March on 29 November 2009, from Sylhet city to the border with India where the river 
Barak bifurcates into the Surma and Kushiara. The March was arranged to draw global 
attention to the potentially devastating impact of the proposed Dam on Sylhet and the 
entire north-eastern region of Bangladesh (Bdnews24.com 2009).
The leaders of Islami Andolan Bangladesh (IAB), in August 2009, submitted a memo-
randum to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Mun via the UNDP representative to Bangla-
desh, seeking help to stop the construction of the Dam. The memorandum contended 
that the plan to construct the Tipaimukh Dam was a clear infringement of the 1996 
Bangladesh-India Joint River Commission (JRC), the International Helsinki Conven-
tion, and International River Law. It also pointed out that the construction of the Dam 
would bring terrible ecological and environmental changes in vast areas of Bangladesh 
and many states of India. On 18 September 2009, IAB arranged a March on to the Indian 
High Commission in Dhaka to protest against the Dam. Other major political parties 
such as The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) have also organized movements 
against the Tipaimukh Dam. Juba Union, the youth wing of CPB, held a two-day Dhaka-
Sylhet road-March program to demand an immediate halt to the construction of the 
Dam (Islam 2013). After 2009, the movement surrounding the Dam gradually became 
less vibrant as Bangladesh faced other political and social crises. Most leaders of this 
movement got arrested and some of them faced execution or forced disappearance.
The movement in India and particularly its northeast regions against the Tipaimukh 
Hydroelectric Project was phenomenal. In April 2009, hundreds of people represent-
ing Bengali, Manipuri, Naga, Khasi, Reang, Dimasa, and other communities from the 
southern part of Assam district staged demonstration in front of the District Commis-
sioner’s office at Silchar. The demonstrators condemned the government’s decision and 
demanded the immediate abrogation of the Dam project. Pijus Kanti Das, secretary gen-
eral of the Committee on Peoples and Environment (COPE), and a number of leaders 
from different organizations and groups joined the demonstration. The demonstrators 
subsequently sent a memoranda separately to the then President Pratibha Patil; Prime 
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Minister Manmohan Singh; Union Minister for Forest and Environment Jairam Ramesh; 
Chief Ministers of Assam and Manipur Tarun Gogoi and O Ibobi Singh respectively 
through the District Commissioner of Cachar. In these memoranda’s, they expressed 
their concern for the people living upstream of Barak River and the potential envi-
ronmental impact of the Dam’s construction (Islam 2013). Protests also took place in 
Manipur, Mizoram, and Barak Valley of Assam.
As indicated earlier, the Indian government initially stated that the project’s object was 
to contain flood-water in the Cachar plains of Assam, and therefore, the people of Cachar 
initially favored the Dam’s construction. However, they joined the movement against the 
proposed Dam when it became apparent that they had been misled. In August 2009, a joint 
meeting between various environmental organizations of Cachar and the Manipur groups 
opposing the building of the Dam was held. The speakers alleged that the Indian govern-
ment had been misleading the downstream people with regard to the benefits of the Dam 
for a long time (Islam 2013). On 28 July 2009, the Hmar People’s Convention (Democratic) 
of Manipur issued a press release which stated that the proposed Tipaimukh Multipurpose 
Hydroelectric Project is a war imposed on the indigenous Hmar people and various other 
communities located downstream and upstream. The power-greedy governments and Dam 
builders in India, who are driven by short-term interests in their blind pursuit of profits, are 
putting indigenous communities at stake. They have not sought the consent and opinions of 
these indigenous communities in whose land the Dam is proposed. A statement from the 
press release stressed that “the Rivers that nursed and fed our honored generations before 
shall continue to flow for all the generations to come. We cannot allow the rivers to be dis-
turbed and are obliged to see that no outsiders, their forces and might will destroy or dis-
turb the natural flow of the rivers of life” (quoted in Islam 2013: 165). It also appealed to 
the visiting Bangladeshi parliamentary delegates to steadfastly share the concern to save the 
rivers Tuiruong and Tuivai; to work together for the collective good; and to save the rivers 
from irreparable damage. Hundreds of people held a rally in an interior town of Manipur’s 
Tamenglong district to protest the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam in early March 
2010. The participants marched through Nungba town, which they said would be affected 
by the proposed Dam, and submitted a memorandum to the state’s chief minister with the 
assistance of the subdivisional officer of Nungba subdivision on 9 March 2010.
Environmental resistance against the Tipaimukh Dam has swept through (Fig.  1) 
North America through formal protests, organizing seminars, and submitting petitions 
to the United Nations (Islam 2013). Along with the physical protests on a global scale, 
there have been a wide range of debate, discussions and protests in the virtual world, 
such as blogs, Facebook, newspapers, and rallies, against the Tipaimukh Dam. More 
than 100 Facebook groups have been created, including “Protest Tipaimukh Dam”, “Stop 
Tipaimukh Dam”, “Protest against Tipaimukh Dam”, “Tipaimukh Dam and Fulertal Bar-
rage–Let’s Stop India”, “Save Our Bangladesh”, “Tipaimukh Dissemination”, “Tipaimukh 
Barrage”, and so forth. To organize and to disseminate the news and information 
related to the Tipaimukh Dam, a good number of blog sites have been launched. Protest 
Tipaimukh Dam, for instance, posted 208 articles and pieces of news analysis related 
to the Dam in 2009. Many other online forums have been formed to resist the Dam’s 
construction. These forums are reported to have mobilized people’s support against the 
Dam throughout the world. Over a dozen online petitions that collected thousands of 
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signatures in favor of the anti-Dam movement were sent to the prime minister of India. 
Beyond Bangladesh, India, and North America, South Asian people inhabiting other 
parts of the world have expressed their deep concern about the constructions of the 
Dam. Adopting various means of social movement, such as protests, petitions, and other 
form of resistance, their endeavors have been aimed at mounting pressure on the Indian 
government to reconsider and to abandon the Dam project.
This “environmentalism of the poor” showed an initial success when the project was halted 
in 2007. The government of India, with its neoliberal agenda prioritizing economic gain over 
ecological and social costs, pursued this project again. Although the movement could not 
stop the project entirely, it pushed the government of both countries to address certain con-
cerns. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina brought up Bangladesh’s concerns relating to the 
Tipaimukh Dam Project with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during their meeting on the 
sidelines of the 15th Non-Aligned Movement Summit held in July 2009 in Egypt (Rahman 
2009; Islam 2013). Following the signing of the “Promoter’s Agreement” on the Tipaimukh 
Hydroelectric Project to set up a Joint Venture Company (JVC) between the Government of 
Manipur, NHPC Ltd. and Sutlej Jal Vidyut Nigam Ltd. in October 2011, in early December of 
the same year, Dr. Mashiur Rahman and Dr. Gowher Rizvi, advisors to Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina paid a visit to New Delhi to discuss Bangladesh’s concerns. In September 
2011, during the Indian prime minister’s visit to Dhaka, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) titled “Indo-Bangladesh Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development” 
was signed by the two Prime Ministers that prevents India from taking any unilateral deci-
sion to construct the Tipaimukh Dam. Official responses stated that technical teams from 
both countries should have regular meetings on this high-voltage issue (Rashid 2013).14
14 The first meeting of the sub-group on Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Project under the Joint Rivers Commission was held 
in New Delhi on August 27–28, 2012. The second two-day meeting of the sub-group ended in Dhaka on 2nd February 
2013, and Dhaka asked Delhi to provide more information and data on the water flow of the Barak River to assess the 
possible negative impacts of the planned dam on the common river on Bangladesh. Some experts suggest that at least 
2 years would take for a comprehensive joint study on the impact of the Tipaimukh project. Thereafter the two countries 
will examine the report of the joint study and decide on the dam (See Rashid 2013).
Fig. 1 The nexus of rivers in north-east Bangladesh and India. Source: Global Voices (2009)
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Conclusion: towards an ecological approach
The Dam is damn! Environmental resistance against the Tipaimukh Dam has been largely 
initiated by the poor; however, the magnitude and scope of the movement is undoubtedly 
diverse and widespread. It is still up for debate whether and to what extent this movement 
is successful. The resistant movement was temporarily successful when the construction 
work was stalled in March 2007 in the wake of protests from within and outside India. 
When the Indian government decided to continue with the project, environmental resist-
ance continued to gain momentum. People in India and Bangladesh are convinced that 
the construction in the name of development and benefiting the local people through 
the provision of free electricity will eventually lead to environmental and social injustice. 
Tipaimukh has become a source of strain for the people of Bangladesh and India. One 
of their common slogans is that “Tipaimukh Dam is death to Sylhet and Bangladesh—it 
must be stopped.” The people of both Bangladesh and India have waged a strong envi-
ronmental movement against the Dam. The movement has taken various shapes—from 
street demonstration to indoor-protests, from seminars and discussion meetings to vir-
tual protests through Facebook, blogs, and other online portals, from developing vari-
ous environmental and social-justice organizations to making alliances among different 
groups to the submission of petitions to the United Nations. Originated by the poor in 
Asia, this environmental movement has spanned across Europe and North America.
River-interventionism has generally been the outcome of the mercantile approach to riv-
ers, which suggests that any flow of river water to the sea is a waste, and that all of it should 
be used up. Such an approach contributes to the downgrading of rivers and increased con-
flict among countries of the river basin. In contrast, there is now a shift from a mercan-
tile to ecological approach, which recommends preservation of the natural volume and 
direction of river flow. Instead of being a source of discord, as is the case with the mer-
cantile approach; under the ecological approach, rivers represent a bond of friendship and 
good neighbourliness. Globally, there is also a shift from the unilateral approach toward 
a multilateral, basin-wide approach that includes all the countries of a river basin in deci-
sion-making processes with respect to the use of the river. Drawing insights from the envi-
ronmental and social-justice movements surrounding the Tipaimukh Dam, we offer some 
pragmatic policy recommendations: First, India should stop proceeding any further with 
the Tipaimukh Dam project and engage in dialogue with Bangladesh with open-minded-
ness on the question of intervention on transnational rivers, particularly, which it shares 
with Bangladesh including the Barak River. Simultaneously, the government of Bangladesh 
ought to be proactive and requires diminishing its dependency on India by attaining politi-
cal legitimacy through allowing and engaging in participatory democratic practices, and 
thus it should exert more pressure on its Indian counterpart so that the Indian govern-
ment is forced to abandon its anti-people and anti-environmental Dam project. Second, 
India should abandon its current unilateral approach; adopt a multi-lateral, basin-wide, 
integrated resource-management approach to the rivers of the region; and invite Bang-
ladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and China to join this effort. Third, Bangladesh, India, and other 
countries of the subcontinent should abandon their current mercantile approach to rivers 
and adopt the ecological approach. Finally, all the concerned stakeholders in both Bangla-
desh and India, including political parties, civil society organizations, NGOs, think tanks, 
media, mass organizations, local people’s organizations, non-resident Bangladeshis and 
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Indians, and so forth, should come together, leaving behind myopic partisan and sectarian 
interests. Stakeholders from both Bangladesh and India should jointly form a high-profile 
international committee to monitor the Tipaimukh project and disseminate necessary and 
updated data and information. This proposed committee can coordinate and contribute 
to movements against Tipaimukh in India, Bangladesh and elsewhere. For Bangladesh, all 
concerned stakeholders including members of civil society organizations, media, NGOs, 
human rights organizations, intellectual groups, business and religious communities, and 
research organizations need to develop and rally behind a common platform and take a 
united national stand regarding Tipaimukh Dam and other river sharing issues, as the 
nation needs national unity and solidarity in order to defend its rivers.
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